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Abstract 
 
This article examines the distribution of sources in journalistic metadiscourse (news 
coverage of journalism) and the implication of the manner of distribution for democracy. 
In this study, the way sources were distributed in the media representation of the debate 
that arose from the News of the World phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry is 
taken as representative of how sources are distributed in journalistic metadiscourse. The 
main method for this study is content analysis. Content analysis was supplemented by 
critical discourse analysis in the study of 870 new articles on the media policy debate, 
from 6 British national newspapers. My findings show that journalistic metadiscourse is 
characterised by a doubly narrow spectrum of sources with access tilting heavily in 
favour of the press. I argue that this is dangerous to democracy and that it may be 
unrealistic to expect the press to function as a democratic public sphere during debates 
about themselves without some level of external coercion.  
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Introduction 
 
This article investigates how sources are 
distributed in journalistic metadiscourse. 
The way sources were distributed in the 
media representation of the debate that 
followed the News of the World (NotW) 
phone hacking scandal is taken as 
representative of how sources are 
distributed in journalistic metadiscourse. 
The News of the World phone hacking 
scandal came to light in 2005 when 
some staff of the British tabloid 
newspaper were accused of hacking the 
phones of members of the British Royal 
Family (Keeble and Mair 2012, 9; Davies 
2014). The police report on investigations 
carried out between 2005 and 2007 
declared that the crime was perpetrated 
by one ‘rogue’ reporter, royal editor Clive 
Goodman, and a private detective, Glen 
Mulcaire (Keeble and Mair 2012, 10–11; 
Jones and Norton 2014, 147–148). The 
report concluded that the victims were a 
handful of public figures (Keeble and 
Mair 2012, 9; Lewis 2013, 72; Davies 
2014).  
 
However, further investigations in 2011 
revealed that phone hacking was 
widespread at the News of the World 
(Keeble and Mair 2012, 9; Davies 2014). 
The case of hacking into the phone of 
the murdered school girl, 13–year–old 
Amanda Jane ‘Milly’ Dowler, resulted in 
public outcry against the British tabloid 
newspaper. News on the phone hacking 
scandal flooded front pages and 
headlines of the media worldwide; 
advertisers withdrew patronage from the 
newspaper and on the 7th of July 2011, 
the company announced the closure of 
the News of the World, bringing to an 
end its one hundred and sixty-eight 
years of publication (Keeble and Mair 
2012, 12; Davies 2014).  
 
Importantly, this scandal led to the 
setting up of the Leveson Inquiry into the 
culture, practices and ethics of the press, 
and stirred up a debate on how to 
reform the press to make it more 
accountable to society. This debate was 
widely covered by the press, presenting 
an excellent opportunity to investigate 
how the media cover themselves, an 
aspect of which is the study of how 
sources are distributed during press 
coverage of media policy debates. This 
article is part of a wider study on how 
the press cover themselves. The main 
research question for this study is ‘How 
were sources distributed in the media 
representation of the debate that arose 
from the News of the World phone 
hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry; 
and what is the implication of the 
manner of distribution for democracy?’ 
One way to sustain democracy is to hold 
the powerful in society to account. The 
media are powerful and as such should 
be held to account through regular 
analyses of journalistic metadiscourse. 
The following section elaborates on the 
importance of studying journalistic 
metadiscourse. 
 
 
Why study journalistic metadiscourse? 
 
The study of journalistic metadiscourse 
(news coverage of journalism) is 
important because of the susceptibility 
of the media to abuse their gatekeeping 
powers and the adverse effect this could 
have on democracy (Putnis 2000; 
Christopher 2007; Stiegler 2013; 
Finneman and Thompson 2014; Carlson 
2014). The process by which the media 
decide which stories among the 
enormity of information available to tell, 
which not to tell, who speaks about them 
(sources) and what versions of 
interpretation to relay to the public, is 
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what is referred to as gatekeeping 
(Shoemaker and Vos 2009; White 1950 
cited in Vos and Heinderyckx 2015, 3).  
 
In the words of Shoemaker and Vos 
(2009, 1), gatekeeping ‘is the process of 
culling and crafting countless bits of 
information into the limited number of 
messages that reach people each day’. 
This process of selection can be based 
on cultural, economic and ideological 
factors (Shoemaker and Vos 2009, 1–4). 
This gatekeeping function endows the 
media with enormous powers because 
they have the power to decide whether 
to allow some arguments or sources into 
the news or whether to give them limited 
access or to keep them out completely 
(Rozell and Mayer 2008, 328; Stiegler 
2013, 137). This gatekeeping power, if 
not checked, can be used in a way that 
gives the press undue advantage in their 
transmission of debates, especially 
debates about themselves (Van Heerden 
1996 cited in Fourie 2001, 205; Rozell 
and Mayer 2008, 328).  
 
The study of journalistic metadiscourse 
can stimulate the media to watch 
against the abuse of their gatekeeping 
powers and cover themselves based on 
democratic principles. Such studies can 
identify when the media are taking 
advantage of their power to control 
information, and make 
recommendations accordingly. It can 
also equip the public with the knowledge 
of how the media cover themselves so 
that they know how to ‘sift the chaff from 
the wheat’ when they consume 
journalistic metadiscourse. Previous 
studies on press self-coverage claim that 
the media do a poor job of covering 
themselves (Carey 1974, 235; Chyi et al. 
2012, 305; Christopher 2007). One of the 
criticisms against press self-coverage is 
that the press gives disproportionate 
access to its interpretations, to the 
detriment of the arguments of other 
stakeholders in debates about press 
reform (Christopher 2007, 42; Stiegler 
2013, 137; Savigny 2016, 12). Previous 
studies claim that the press avoids or 
gives limited coverage to criticisms 
against themselves and that journalistic 
metadiscourse is characterised by a lack 
of self-critique (Carey 1974; Eason 1988; 
Lule 1992; Christopher 2007, 42; Haas 
2006, cited in Carlson 2015, 9). A 
consequence of such a coverage is the 
emergence of weak media policies that 
cannot guarantee a democratic public 
sphere. The normative expectation is that 
the media ought to serve as a 
democratic public sphere where all 
stakeholders, regardless of their status, 
can contribute to debates that concern 
them; and that includes the press reform 
debate that followed the News of the 
World phone hacking scandal (Habermas 
1989).  
 
 
The media as a democratic public 
sphere 
 
Habermas conceptualises the public 
sphere as an arena where people meet 
to discuss societal concerns and through 
their arguments influence political 
decisions (Habermas 1989, 1–4). 
According to Habermas, equality was 
brought about by a complete disregard 
for status because all voices regardless 
of their status were allowed to air their 
views and decisions were not based on 
societal standing but on the best rational 
argument (1989, 4). Habermas (1989, 
32–41) observed that in the late 17th 
and early 18th centuries, coffee houses, 
salons and clubs sufficed as meeting 
points for these public deliberations, but 
in modern democracies, discussions in 
salons (coffee shops and bars) rarely 
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carry the same weight due to the large 
numbers of people that make up most 
political communities today. This places 
a premium on the role of the media as a 
democratic public sphere: a public space 
where citizens can debate issues that 
concern them without any form of 
marginalisation (Benhabib 1992, 81–87; 
Ornebring and Jonsson 2004, 283).  
 
According to Habermas’ (1989, 83; 1989 
cited in Calhoun 1992, 137) account of 
the ‘golden age of the liberal public 
sphere’, discussions were centred on 
issues of common concern. However, 
from the late 19th century, the public 
sphere began to degenerate and 
commercialism began to override public 
interest within this public space 
(Habermas 1989, 184; Dahlgren 1995, 
34; Street 2001, 42; 2010, 56). Habermas 
argued that commercial interest merged 
with private interests, including the 
interests of policymakers, to turn the 
public sphere from a democratic forum 
for public debate into a capitalist haven 
where prioritisation of profit became the 
order of the day (1989, 189–193). 
Facilitators of debates in the media’s 
public sphere became more concerned 
about ‘what interests the public’ rather 
than what was ‘in the public interest’ 
with the goal being to increase 
readership and attract advertisers.  
 
This study argues that the 
commodification of the public sphere is 
more complex than previous studies 
have shown. Most studies on the media 
as a public sphere have focussed on the 
media representation of others and not 
of themselves. As such, scholars have not 
taken into consideration the 
commodification of a public sphere in 
which the deliberation relates to the 
facilitator of the sphere. The result was 
that commercialism was limited to 
prioritisation of gains made from 
advertising (‘selling customers to 
advertisers’), adopting paywalls and 
direct product sales (Picard 1985; 
McQuail 2010, 222–224), whereas in the 
media coverage of debates on 
journalism, commodification of the 
public sphere can go beyond the 
aforementioned to the prioritisation of 
the media’s personal interests (giving 
priority to the ‘sale’ of the newspaper’s 
argument to the public). In this case, the 
media’s personal interests can override 
‘what interests the public’. This can result 
in the marginalisation of sources or 
discourses that are perceived as not 
being in the interest of media owners 
(Christopher 2007). 
 
In a democratic society, it is expected 
that all sections of society will have 
access to the press because it serves as 
a major medium of information and 
communication. If individuals are to 
contribute to government policy through 
participating in public debates, then all 
sections of society will need to have 
access to the press, especially when 
issues that concern them are the 
subjects of debate. Studies claim that 
this has not been the case. The media 
have often been accused of advancing 
elite discourses to the detriment of the 
less powerful in society (Galtung and 
Ruge 1965, cited in Harcup and O’Neill 
2010, 270), thereby not giving equal 
opportunities to various stakeholders in 
debates that take place in the media’s 
public sphere. It is alleged that inequality 
in communicative discourse in such a 
sphere is heightened when the media 
becomes the subject of the debate, 
riskily advantaging the press (Christopher 
2007, 42; Stiegler 2013, 137; Savigny 
2016, 12). The danger of favouring elite 
or media sources in press reform 
debates is that the views of a stratum of 
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society dominate the public sphere while 
those of the less powerful are hardly 
heard. This can result in the expression 
of a narrow spectrum of views in the 
media’s public sphere and poor policy 
decisions.  
 
Contesting Habermas’ concept of one 
central public sphere where issues of 
common interest are discussed and 
decisions are reached based on the best 
rational judgement, Fraser argues that 
democracy is enhanced not with a single 
comprehensive public sphere but with 
‘arrangements that accommodate 
contestation among a plurality of 
competing publics’ (1992, 122 cited in 
Butsch 2007, 5). She emphasized that 
because the common good is difficult to 
determine, contestation within the public 
sphere rather than a consensus is closer 
to the democratic ideal. This study 
agrees. It posits that democracy is 
enhanced not with a single 
comprehensive discursive public sphere, 
but with a situation that makes room for 
contestations among diverse competing 
discursive publics (Fraser1992, 122 cited 
in Butsch 2007, 5).  
 
The exclusion or marginalisation of any 
segment of the population (of 
stakeholders) from a debate will run 
contrary to ‘democracy’s claim of 
universalism’ (Dahlgren 1995; 36). 
Normatively, the type of space or amount 
of coverage given ought not to be based 
on the media’s self-interest. The media 
ought to remain a free marketplace of 
ideas when they represent others as well 
as when they represent themselves. The 
following section outlines the methods 
used to investigate how the press served 
as a public sphere in relation to the use 
of sources during their coverage of the 
debate that followed the News of the 
World phone hacking scandal. 
Method 
 
As earlier stated, the main research 
question for this study is ‘How were 
sources distributed in the media 
representation of the debate that arose 
from the News of the World phone 
hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry; 
and what is the implication of the 
manner of distribution for democracy?’ 
This central question was broken down 
into two: 
 
RQ1: What sources were used and which 
of them was most frequently quoted?  
 
RQ2: What quality of space did the press 
give the various stakeholders and their 
arguments in the debate that followed 
the phone hacking scandal? 
 
RQ1 is concerned with the diversity of 
sources used by the press in their 
coverage of the media policy debate and 
how frequently the various sources were 
used. In a democracy, the normative 
expectation is that all stakeholders in a 
debate will have proportionate access to 
the public sphere. RQ1 is in response to 
claims that elite sources dominate the 
public sphere and that ordinary citizens 
and sources critical of the press are 
allotted a weak position of access to the 
public sphere (Galtung and Ruge 1965 
cited in Harcup and O’Neill 2010, 270). 
This question prompted my exploration 
of how the press used sources in the 
debate that arose from the NotW phone 
hacking scandal and the Leveson inquiry.  
 
RQ2 requires a close study of the 
narrative structure of each story in the 
study sample to identify the importance 
accorded to the arguments of various 
stakeholders in the debate. Studying the 
priority accorded to certain arguments 
and issues of concern in the debate is 
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important because it helps me evaluate 
how well the media served as a 
democratic public sphere, a sphere 
where the hierarchy of importance of an 
argument is not based on status (who 
the debater is) but on the strength of his 
or her argument (Habermas 1989). This 
line of enquiry follows accusations that 
the media use their gatekeeping powers 
to prevent arguments not in their favour 
from gaining access to the public sphere.  
 
 
Research sample 
 
My study sample comprises all news 
articles on the debate that arose from 
the NotW phone hacking scandal and 
the Leveson inquiry, in six of the top ten 
British national newspapers (based on 
combined print and online readership 
figures for April 2011 to March 2012 – 
Source: NRS PADD 2012): two 
newspapers from each category of the 
main newspaper classification in the UK. 
My decision to do only two from each 
category is for the purpose of 
manageability. I chose to look at national 
papers because of their nationwide 
reach. The national newspapers in Britain 
are categorised in terms of social class, 
although this classification does not 
always reflect reality (McNAir 2000, 14). 
From the broadsheet (hard or ‘serious-
minded’ news content) category, I 
examined the Daily Telegraph and the 
Guardian; from the mid-market (‘less 
serious’) category, I studied the Daily Mail 
and the Daily Express; and from the 
tabloids (celebrity, sensational and 
entertainment-style news) I looked at The 
Sun and the Daily Mirror.  
 
My unit of analysis consists of all news 
articles on the media policy debate that 
arose from the NotW phone hacking 
scandal and the Leveson inquiry as 
contained in the Daily Telegraph, 
Guardian, Daily Mail, Daily Express, Daily 
Mirror and The Sun; from the 14th of 
November 2011 (when the hearing 
began at the Leveson Inquiry) to the 14th 
of November 2013 (the aftermath of the 
Privy Council’s approval of a Royal 
Charter on press regulation). This two-
year period falls within the time frame 
when media coverage of the press 
reform debate was at its peak in the UK 
(Macfarlane and Torpey 2012, n.p.; 
Independent, 28 December 2013, n.p.).  
 
Although editorials are where the 
newspaper’s opinions are often heard 
(Hindman 2003, 671), I decided against 
limiting my study sample to editorials 
because as Wahl-Jorgensen (2008, 67) 
pointed out, ‘in the British context … 
expression of judgements and opinions 
is frequently not limited to the op-ed and 
editorial pages, but increasingly pervades 
every section of the newspaper’. 
Therefore, limiting the study to editorials 
risks leaving out interpretations of the 
debate that featured in the news section 
of the newspapers. My data, thus, 
included both opinion and news articles 
that captured the media policy debate 
which followed the NotW phone hacking 
scandal. 
 
 
Data collection 
 
My study sample was obtained from 
Nexis UK, an electronic archive service 
with full text access to all UK national 
newspapers. Using the search terms, 
‘press regulation’ or ‘press laws’ or 
‘public trust’ or ‘media ownership’ or 
‘public interest’ or ‘privacy’ (anywhere in 
the text) and ‘Leveson’ or ‘News of the 
World’ or ‘phone hacking’ (anywhere in 
the text), my search produced a total of 
1485 news articles. After cleaning the 
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sample by deleting repeats and 
unrelated stories, the sample was 
reduced to 870; 323 from the Guardian, 
199 from the Daily Telegraph, 173 from 
the Daily Mail, 28 from the Daily Express, 
96 from The Sun and 51 from the Daily 
Mirror. The large reduction in the 
number of articles from 1485 to 870 was 
largely due to the high number of 
duplicate articles in Nexis UK. To take 
care of the differences in the number of 
news articles per paper, measurements 
were mostly based on percentage within 
the paper rather than a percentage of 
the whole sample. 
 
This study’s major method of 
investigation is content analysis. Content 
analysis is the systematic and objective 
analysis of texts such as can be found in 
newspaper articles, television clips, 
books, adverts etc. (Holsti 1969, 14 cited 
in Stemler 2001, 17; Neuman 2003, 310; 
Mosdell and Davies 2006, 98). In content 
analysis, textual components (example 
words, phrases, images etc.) relevant to 
the findings of one’s research are 
counted, recorded and then calculated 
with the use of statistical methods 
(Krippendorff 1980/2004 cited in Zelizer 
2004, 115; Riffe et al. 2005, 3). The 
understanding is that the results when 
analysed can provide answers to the 
research questions.  
 
In this study, content analysis was 
supplemented by critical discourse 
analysis (CDA). I used some principles 
from Norman Fairclough’s approach to 
CDA (1992a; 1992b; 1995a; 1995b; 2005) 
because it enabled me to link language 
to social issues of contention such as 
media ownership concentration and its 
resultant social consequences (Phillips 
and Jorgensen 2002, 65; Gee and 
Handford 2012b, 1). Since, CDA is only a 
supplementary method of analysis in this 
study, it was only used to elucidate the 
results of my content analysis. 
Complementing content analysis with 
critical discourse analysis enabled me to 
provide comprehensive answers to my 
research questions. A coding scheme 
was designed to enable me to input the 
data for my content analysis. 
 
 
Coding scheme 
 
Berelson (1952, 18 cited in Richardson 
2007, 15) emphasized the characteristic 
of content analysis as an objective 
research procedure, free from the 
researcher’s interference. This ‘objectivity’ 
requirement of content analysis also 
requires that the research be done in 
such a way that it can be replicated by 
anyone who chooses to do so (Altheide 
1996, 15; Hansen et al., 1998, 91; 
Krippendorff 2004, 18–19). To ensure 
reliability, the coding sheet was drawn up 
with guidelines to make the study 
replicable, and was tested and re-tested 
by two trained postgraduate student 
coders.  
 
Thirty stories randomly selected from the 
study sample were tested until the 
overall percentage agreement reached 
an average of 95.9 per cent with the 
lowest variable reaching 80 per cent 
agreement. The high level of percentage 
agreement across all variables helps to 
guarantee that this research can be 
replicated, and where this is done similar 
results can be achieved. The calculations 
were made using ReCal2 0.1 Alpha 
(dfreelon.org). ReCal2 is an online 
reliability calculator for two coders which 
calculates intercoder reliability 
coefficients for nominal data and 
produces results for percentage 
agreements. The result of my intercoder 
reliability test as computed by ReCal2 
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was Krippendorff’s Alpha 0.822. The 
results of my content analysis are 
presented in the next section.  
 
 
Findings 
 
As earlier stated, my study sample 
comprised 870 news articles; 323 from 
the Guardian, 199 from the Daily 
Telegraph, 173 from the Daily Mail, 28 
from the Daily Express, 96 from The Sun, 
and 51 from the Daily Mirror. Table 1 
presents statistical data on how sources 
were used in the coverage of the press 
reform debate that followed the NotW 
phone hacking scandal. In Table 2, the 
sources are grouped in related 
categories to show how each of these 
groups featured as sources in the 
debate. Table 3 shows the frequency at 
which different category of writers, wrote 
articles on the press reform debate. In 
Table 4, the writers are grouped in 
related categories to show how much 
space each of these groups was given to 
write articles on the press reform debate. 
Though these results have limitations in 
terms of generalisability, they give insight 
into how the press use sources during 
their representation of debates about 
themselves. The results from my 
investigation into the use of sources 
provided answers to RQ1 ‘What sources 
were used and which of them was most 
frequently quoted?’.  
 
Table 8.1 revealed that 46.1 per cent of 
news sources on the debate were press 
related; out of this number, 37.3 per cent 
were journalists (not editors), 3.7 per 
cent were news editors; 2.8 per cent 
were from press bodies such as the PCC 
and IPSO, while 2.3 per cent came from 
newspaper and magazine publishers (see 
Tables 1 and 2). Out of the remaining 
53.9 per cent, policymakers (for the 
purpose of this study policymakers 
include the government, government 
institutions and politicians) made up 24.5 
per cent of sources. 6.5 per cent of the 
number were Conservative Party 
spokespersons, 4.8 per cent were from 
the Labour Party, 3.8 per cent were 
Government spokespersons, another 3.8 
were ‘other politicians’, 2.7 per cent were 
from the Liberal Democratic Party who 
were then in coalition government with 
the Conservatives; 2.2 per cent of 
sources were from the Department of 
Culture, Media and Sports (DCMS) and 
0.7 were cross-party – a team made up 
of the three major political parties – 
Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and 
Labour (see Tables 2 and 3). Sources 
related to ‘press abuse victims’ featured 
in 9.2 per cent of the study sample; 4.5 
per cent were campaigners for victims of 
press abuse, while 4.7 per cent were the 
victims themselves. The categorising of 
these two sources was a little difficult 
because some prominent campaigners 
for victims, like Hugh Grant, were also 
victims of press abuse. From the 
statistics, we see that these three groups 
alone (press related, policymakers and 
press abuse victims) made up 79.8 per 
cent of the sources (see Tables 1 and 2).  
 
Press regulation document related 
sources (the Leveson Inquiry and the 
Royal Charter on press regulation) made 
up 7.8 per cent of the sources (See 
Tables 1 and 2). The voice of the judiciary 
made up 2.2 per cent of the sources; 
and the police 2.1 per cent – same as a 
variety of other sources labelled as 
‘other’. Ordinary members of the public 
made up only 1.6 per cent of the 
sources. This agrees with previous 
findings which posit that ordinary 
sources have a weak position in the 
hierarchy of access to the media (GUMG 
1976, 244–245; Boyd-Barrett 1987, 109; 
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Allan 2005, 55–56; Boler et al. 2010, 
215). 
 
This inequality in the distribution of 
sources was also identified in the 
category of writers of articles in the study 
sample. Understandably, newspaper staff 
wrote the bulk of the stories in the study 
sample, accounting for 91.5 per cent of 
writers of articles on the debate (see 
Table 3). What is of interest is the 
distribution of other contributors. 
 
Table 3 shows that out of the remaining 
8.5 per cent of contributors (outside the 
newspaper’s staff), 4.3 per cent were 
press related: 2.2 per cent were from 
‘other media’ organisations; 1.4 per cent 
were written by campaigners for press 
freedom; and 0.7 per cent were former 
media executives (see Tables 3 and 4). 
The remaining 4.1 per cent were shared 
among eight other contributors. 
Policymakers (‘politicians’ and 
‘government’) made up 1.4 per cent of 
that amount making them another 
significant group used as sources (see 
Tables 3 and 4). Sources related to ‘press 
abuse victims’ made up 1 per cent of the 
amount: 0.7 per cent were campaigners 
for victims of the press and 0.3 per cent 
were written by the victims themselves 
(see Tables 3 and 4). Though this amount 
is less than the percentage of sources 
from policymakers and far less than the 
number of contributors that were press 
related, the victims of press abuse and 
their campaigners still emerged as one 
of the stakeholders whose voices 
featured in a significant proportion of the 
debate, accounting for 9.2 per cent of 
the sources and 1 per cent of 
contributors to the debate. Academics 
also came close to one per cent (0.9) 
(see Tables 3 and 4). Representatives of 
associations, members of the public and, 
surprisingly, corporate organisations 
each had under 0.4 per cent 
representation among sources used in 
the journalistic metadiscourse (see Table 
4). 
 
This result does not reflect a democratic 
public sphere for a number of reasons 
which are explained in the following 
section. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The findings of this study show that 
journalistic metadiscourse is 
characterised by a doubly narrow 
spectrum of sources. ‘Doubly narrow’ 
because the range of sources are narrow 
and within the narrow spectrum of 
sources, press-related sources dominate 
the discourse. This agrees with 
arguments by previous studies that the 
media is dominated by a narrow 
spectrum of sources (Graber and 
Dunaway 2014). While I share the view 
that the press were vital participants 
because the debate was about them; the 
policymakers were vital because they 
were the decision-making sphere; and 
the victims were vital because they had 
first-hand experience relevant to the 
debate, I argue that limiting the debate 
in the media’s public sphere to this 
narrow spectrum of stakeholders risks 
leaving out large sections of the society 
that do not fall within these major 
categories but are inarguably 
stakeholders in the debate on press 
standards. It can be argued that this 
narrow spectrum of sources reduced the 
diversity of views about press reform 
expressed in the media’s public sphere 
and limited the options that were 
available to policymakers from which 
they made decisions on how to regulate 
the press. 
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Press-related sources 
 
The dominance of the media as sources 
within an already narrow spectrum of 
sources is a double cause for concern. 
The gap between press-related sources 
and other sources in the study sample 
(see Table 2) demonstrates how the 
gatekeeping power of the press can be 
used to their advantage (Lewin 1947, 
1951, cited in Reese and Vos, 2009, 11–
14; Shoemaker and Vos 2009, 1; White 
1950, cited in Vos and Heinderyckx 
2015, 3). The press became the powerful 
elite with the dominant voice while the 
rest of society were, apparently, at its 
mercy in the debate. Though it can be 
argued that there are various channels 
through which the public can participate 
in this debate, such as via online news 
websites and blogs that advance counter 
discourses, studies have established that 
considerable numbers of people still 
depend on the mainstream press for 
hard news content (Wall 2004, 13, cited 
in Haas 2012, 147; Haas 2012, 148). 
Despite the dive in newspaper 
readership in the UK (Newsworks 2015), 
the national press represented by this 
study sample still has an average daily 
readership of 12.2 million, which 
demonstrates the number of people in 
society consuming discourse from this 
doubly narrow spectrum of sources. The 
danger is that the views and 
interpretations of a particular stratum of 
society dominate the media discourse 
(Galtung and Ruge 1965 cited in Harcup 
and O’Neill 2010, 270). Interestingly, the 
views of the press were not only 
expressed by press-related sources but 
were also passed across through other 
sources as can be seen in the next 
section. 
 
 
‘It takes two to tango’: the media and 
policymakers 
 
A close look at the context within which 
sources were used in the press coverage 
of the debate that arose from the phone 
hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry 
revealed that the press had the 
dominant position in their relationship 
with policymakers during the media 
policy debate. The press apparently used 
their gatekeeping powers to see to it that 
only policymakers who expressed 
support for their position in the debate 
featured as contributors of opinion 
articles on the debate in their 
newspapers. For instance, policymakers 
who were contributors to the Daily 
Telegraph were largely in support of the 
argument that statutory underpinning 
was a threat to press freedom (Mason 
2012, 26; Johnson 2012a, 4), while those 
who were contributors to news articles in 
the Guardian countered the argument 
that statutory underpinning posed a 
threat to press freedom (Lester 2012, 30; 
Fowler 2013, 24; Huhne 2013, 36). And in 
the articles, some policymakers virtually 
reproduced the newspaper’s position in 
the debate. For example, Boris Johnson, 
the then Mayor of London, wrote a two-
page opinion article in The Sun titled ‘'It's 
one of the glories of this country that we 
have free, exuberant media. They keep 
public life much cleaner & that makes 
Britain a wonderful place to live’ 
(Johnson 2012b, 11–12). The dominant 
theme of that report was ‘against press 
law and statutory underpinning’.  
 
On the other hand, an article written by a 
member of the House of Lords, Norman 
Fowler and published by the Guardian 
newspaper expressed support for 
statutory underpinning of a new press 
regulatory body (Fowler 2013, 24). The 
fact that Norman Fowler, a former 
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Conservative Cabinet minister and party 
chairman, gained access to publish his 
view on the debate in the left-wing 
leaning Guardian, goes a long way to 
show that the primary criteria for access 
in this self-coverage, may have been tied 
to the position of the newspaper in the 
debate. It appears as if the press had 
said ‘you either dance to our tune or find 
somewhere else to publish your view’. 
This trend can, arguably, be described as 
collusion between politicians and the 
media.  
 
Some politicians have been accused of 
supporting the arguments of the press in 
order to receive their backing in the 
elections which were not far off at the 
time. For instance, when it was revealed 
in 2016 that four newspapers (The Sun, 
Independent, Mail on Sunday and 
Independent on Sunday) were privy to 
information that the then chairman of 
the Commons Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee, John Whittingdale had 
previously been involved in a relationship 
with a woman he met on an online 
dating website who happened to be a 
sex worker, and had not published it, 
some press reform campaigners and the 
Labour Party alleged that some sort of 
deal may have taken place between this 
executive and the press (BBC News, 13 
April 2016, n.p.). John Whittingdale who 
was then the Conservative MP for Maldon 
and East Chelmsford denied any such 
deal with the press and the papers 
claimed they decided not to publish 
because he was not a minister at the 
time of the relationship and as such it 
was not in the public interest (BBC News, 
13 April 2016, n.p.).  
 
There were also assumptions that Boris 
Johnson may have danced to the tune of 
the bulk of the national press in the 
press reform debate because he had an 
ambition to become the next Prime 
Minister of Britain after David Cameron 
and would, therefore, need the support 
of this large section of the national press. 
Whether or not there was a deal 
between the press and John Whittingdale 
or even a personal move by Boris 
Johnson to seek the press’ favour for 
political ambition, the fact remains that 
some politicians in both spheres largely 
reproduced arguments of the press in 
the debate. In this case, though it still 
takes two to tango, the press leads. It is 
worthy of note that while the Leveson 
Inquiry condemned the relationship 
between the press and politicians for 
being ‘too cosy’ (Leveson Inquiry Report 
Volume 4, 1969; The Daily Telegraph, 30 
November 2012, 11), the very coverage 
of the inquiry and that of the rest of the 
debate appear to have been shaped by a 
similar level of closeness. The 
consequence for democracy here is that 
checks needed to prevent abuse of 
power by both the fourth and third 
estates of the realm gradually become 
eroded (Allan and Zelizer 2010, 48). A 
tango between the press and politicians 
poses a threat to democracy. It can, for 
instance, result in the emergence to 
power of a politician who though without 
the quality to lead, cosied up to the 
press or benefited its financial interest in 
some way.  
 
 
Victims as ‘steakholders’ 
 
Though the number of victim-related 
sources is far less than the number of 
press-and policy-related sources as 
shown on Tables 1 and 2, the victims of 
press abuse and their campaigners still 
emerged as one of the stakeholders 
whose voices featured in a significant 
proportion of the debate, accounting for 
9.2 per cent of the sources and 1 per 
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cent of contributors to the debate (see 
Tables 1–4). While I agree that this 
demographic is very important to the 
debate and ought to have been given 
more space in the journalistic 
metadiscourse, I argue that the 
construction of victims as ‘the 
stakeholders’ further marginalizes other 
sections of society.  
 
One major problem with the 
construction of victims as ‘the 
stakeholders’ is its composition. A look at 
the victims used as sources revealed 
that they were mostly famous (well-
known) people. They included persons 
whose life stories attained the status of 
newsworthiness because of their 
celebrity status or high public profile 
(Harcup and O’Neill’s 2010, 168; 2010, 
270; 2016, 2). Among them were actor 
Hugh Grant (Sweeney 2013, n.p.), 
comedian Steve Coogan (O'Carroll 2012, 
n.p.), singer Charlotte Church (Glover 
2012, n.p.) and author JK Rowling 
(Luckhurst 2012, 25).  
 
Another group of victims used as 
sources included persons who became 
famous because of their connection to a 
newsworthy event such as the Dowlers 
(Rayner 2012, 6), the McCanns (Beattie 
2013, 26), Christopher Jefferies (Allen 
and Evans 2012, n.p.), the 7 July 2005 
London bombing survivor (Hill 2012, n.p.), 
or persons closely related to any of the 
two categories of victims (Cohen 2013, 
n.p.). So, famous people that have been 
hurt by the press were constructed as 
‘the stakeholders’. That is of course a 
narrow spectrum of stakeholders of the 
British press. Though it may be argued 
that the press would more likely invade 
the privacy of the rich or famous than 
the ordinary citizen in society, studies 
show that ordinary citizens are also 
affected by press excesses: an example 
is minority groups who are often 
stereotyped in the news. Such people 
ought to have been adequately 
represented in the debate on press 
standards in the media’s public sphere.  
 
Though the academic community made 
up nearly one per cent of the 
contributors, some were former 
journalists (for example, Professors Tim 
Luckhurst and Brian Cathcart), it was 
mainly lecturers speaking in the press. 
The student population which form part 
of the 21 per cent of young adult 
readership (ages 18–34) of the national 
dailies in the country (NRS October 
2015-September 2016, cited by 
Newsworks 2015) had little or no input in 
the debate in the journalistic 
metadiscourse. The works of academics 
on the phone hacking and press 
standards were occasionally reviewed as 
part of expert analysis of the NotW 
phone hacking scandal and press 
standards in general (The Guardian, 26 
March 2013, n.; 21 March 2013, n.; the 
Daily Telegraph, 25 October 2012, 25). 
This made them another recognisable 
voice in the journalistic metadiscourse.  
 
People from other sectors of society 
such as those who have not faced any 
form of press misconduct should have 
also formed a relevant demographic as 
their views may be much more neutral in 
relation to how to balance the issue of 
privacy with that of press freedom. My 
intention here is not to belittle the 
importance of the victims of press 
misconduct to the debate but to argue 
that they are only one relevant 
demographic out of a number and that 
should have been reflected in the 
journalistic metadiscourse. There is the 
tendency that victims advocating for 
press reform can make suggestions out 
of anger and frustration at the press. 
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Therefore, a mix of those that have 
experienced press abuse and those that 
have not been directly hurt would have 
made a more balanced group of 
stakeholders.  
 
What emerged instead was a rhetoric or 
discourse that constructed the victims of 
press abuse as the only demographic 
that needed the service of an 
accountable press. As such, whatever 
proposal was going to be made by the 
Leveson Inquiry must pass ‘the victims 
test’. Policymakers, the press and even 
the victims themselves all advanced this 
rhetoric as can be seen in this statement 
written by the Guardian’s Dan Sabbagh: 
 
Victims have a veto. David 
Cameron, giving evidence, said that 
the test of the effectiveness of the 
Leveson Inquiry would be its 
impact on those who have suffered 
from press intrusion. ‘If families like 
the Dowlers feel this has really 
changed the way they would have 
been treated, we would have done 
our job properly’, he said. (Sabbagh 
2012, 11) 
 
The victims were thus, what I refer to as 
the ‘steakholders’ in the debate. 
According to symbols scholar Ivan J. 
Thomas: 
 
To dream of a steak represents 
situations that allow you to have 
total control, to make the 
important decisions, have authority, 
or feel all powerful. Having things 
your way. It usually symbolizes 
decision making that is in your 
best interest or situations that 
allow you to dictate terms. (Thomas 
2016, 149) 
 
My use of steak here is not to engage in 
a discussion on symbols but to explicate 
the construction of press abuse victims 
in the journalistic metadiscourse on the 
journalism debate. This construction of 
victims as ‘steakholders’ may have 
accounted for victim-related sources 
emerging among the top three sources 
used in the study sample as shown in 
Table 2. Having examined how sources 
were distributed in the press coverage of 
the media policy debate that followed 
the NotW phone hacking scandal, the 
next section presents my findings on the 
importance accorded diverse issues of 
concern in the public sphere. 
 
 
Hierarchy of importance: issues of 
concern  
 
Table 5 reveals that that the top three 
subjects in the hierarchy of importance 
were press freedom (16.7 per cent); 
arguments against press law and 
statutory regulation (12.4 per cent); and 
public interest (6.9 per cent). The least in 
the order of importance within this 
category was ‘against self-regulation’ (0.4 
per cent) along with ‘[neutral] comments 
on statutory underpinning’ (0.4). Though 
the Guardian gave much space to 
countering that argument, the ‘press 
freedom’ theme did not appear at the 
top of the Guardian’s narrative structure 
as frequently as it did in the other 
newspapers.  
 
Though the Guardian also claimed to be 
against full-blown statutory regulation of 
the press, arguments against statutory 
regulation were not given much space at 
the top of its narrative structure, 
appearing at the top in only 3.2 per cent 
of its sample as opposed to 26.3 per 
cent of the Daily Mirror, 19.8 per cent of 
The Sun, 17.9 per cent of the Daily 
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Telegraph and 17.6 per cent of the Daily 
Mail (see Table 5). While this shows the 
Guardian’s voice against statutory 
regulation was weak, it also confirms 
how averse much of the press was to 
statutory regulation.  
 
Though the subject of ‘media 
owners/ownership’ was high up in the 
Daily Mirror’s hierarchy of importance, 
emerging third place with 13.2 per cent 
of appearances at the top, the 
discussions were not on concentration of 
media ownership but were on the 
trouble that had befallen Rupert 
Murdoch, owner of the News of the 
World, and his staff as a result of the 
phone hacking scandal (Flanagan 2012, 
4; Dixon 2013, 7). This served more as 
infotainment, a dramatic narration of 
their ordeal. 
 
Some key issues in the debate did not 
gain entrance into this sphere of 
importance (top of the narrative 
structure) in the Daily Mirror. They 
include arguments against the new press 
regulatory system formed by the press; 
support for statutory underpinning; and 
support for the Leveson Inquiry and 
arguments in support of an independent 
press regulatory system, along with some 
neutral comments (see Table 5). A close 
look at the issues that received no space 
at the top of the Daily Mirror’s narrative 
structure reveals that they are 
arguments that are considered as not in 
the interest of the commercial press. 
This trend of giving prime place in the 
narrative structure to arguments 
perceived to be in their interest, with 
little or no mention of opposing views 
within that sphere of importance was 
more prominent in The Sun, the Daily 
Mirror, the Daily Express, the Daily Mail 
and the Daily Telegraph compared to the 
Guardian (see Table 5). This 
demonstrates that the commercial press 
gives more quality space to arguments 
or issues they perceive to be in their 
interest during their representation of 
media policy debates. This finding affirms 
the claim by previous studies that the 
gatekeeping powers of the media are 
prone to abuse when the media cover 
themselves (McQuail 2002, cited in Miller 
2006, 41; Shoemaker and Vos 2009, 1; 
White 1950, cited in Vos and 
Heinderyckx 2015, 3). This manner of 
coverage can have an adverse effect on 
democracy because it privileges the 
voice of the press above those of other 
stakeholders in debates about media 
policy. This finding confirms the claim by 
previous studies which say the press 
avoids or gives limited coverage to 
criticisms against themselves and that 
journalistic metadiscourse is 
characterised by a lack of self-critique 
(Carey 1974; Eason 1988; Lule 1992; 
Christopher 2007b, 42; Haas 2006, cited 
in Carlson 2015, 9).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has shown that the 
journalistic metadiscourse on the debate 
that followed the News of the World 
phone hacking scandal featured a 
doubly narrow spectrum of sources; 
‘doubly narrow’ because the range of 
sources was narrow, and within the 
narrow spectrum, access tilted heavily in 
favour of press-related sources. 
Policymakers came next to the press in 
the hierarchy of access to deliberations 
about media policy in the public sphere. 
The media’s dependence on 
policymakers as sources can be 
attributed to the fact that they serve as 
credible sources of information, and 
because they have the power to make 
decisions on media policy. The power of 
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political leaders to make policy decisions 
on the media and the power of the press 
to either make or mar a political career 
make them collaborate with one another 
for ‘favourable’ press coverage to 
promote a political career in exchange 
for ‘favourable’ media policies that 
advance the interest of the commercial 
press.  
 
My findings revealed that newspapers 
used as sources political leaders who 
reproduced the paper’s views in the 
debate. The situation suggests a tango 
between the press and politicians in 
which the press played the leading role. 
Applying Gans’ (Gans 1979, 116) use of 
the dance metaphor, I argued that in the 
case of the press use of sources during 
its coverage of the debate that arose 
from the phone hacking scandal and the 
Leveson Inquiry, ‘it takes two to tango, 
but the press leads’. This study found 
that victims of press abuse were 
represented as ‘the steakholders’ rather 
than ‘a stakeholder’ of the debate. While 
acknowledging the importance of the 
victims to the debate, I contend that 
limiting the stakeholder status to those 
who have been hurt by the press results 
in a limited range of views and risks 
shutting down more neutral voices that 
could have enriched the debate in the 
media’s public sphere.  
 
On how different subjects of the debate 
were accorded priority in the debate, my 
findings revealed a trend in which 
arguments perceived to be in the 
media’s self-interest were given more 
quality space (high up in the narrative 
structure) than those considered to be 
against their interest. For example, ‘press 
freedom’ featured more frequently than 
any other theme at the top of the 
narrative structure while the arguments, 
‘against self-regulation’ and ‘against new 
press regulatory system formed by the 
press’ were among issues that had the 
fewest occurrences within this sphere of 
importance. In sum, the sources used 
were too narrow as such the debate 
lacked robustness such that other 
options, for example, non-governmental 
public reformism, were not explored as a 
means of achieving press accountability.  
 
In sum, my findings affirm that the 
gatekeeping powers of the media are 
prone to abuse when the media cover 
themselves (McQuail 2002 cited in Miller 
2006, 41; Shoemaker and Vos 2009; 1; 
White 1950, cited in Vos and 
Heinderyckx 2015, 3). This study 
highlights the need for the press to 
expand their use of sources, and 
function as a democratic public sphere 
in debates about themselves. I argue that 
because bias is inevitable (Kieran 1997, 
57; ELmessiri 2006, 49), it is difficult for 
the press to function as a democratic 
public sphere in debates about 
themselves; as such some form of 
external intervention, for example public 
reformism, may be necessary to compel 
the press to serve as a democratic 
public sphere during self-coverage.  
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Sources  
Frequency of 
sources 
Percentage of 
sources 
Campaigners for victims of press 
abuse 537 4.5% 
Leveson Inquiry 827 7.0% 
Royal Charter 97 0.8% 
Campaigners for press freedom 495 4.2% 
The press 4420 37.3% 
Press body such as IPSO 331 2.8% 
News editors 441 3.7% 
Newspaper and magazine publishers 278 2.3% 
Conservative spokesperson 776 6.5% 
Police 253 2.1% 
Labour shadow government 573 4.8% 
Coalition Liberal Democrats 325 2.7% 
Cross-party 85 0.7% 
Culture, Media and Sport 255 2.2% 
Government spokesperson 453 3.8% 
Other politicians 454 3.8% 
Victims of press abuse 559 4.7% 
Ordinary members of the public 184 1.6% 
Judiciary 263 2.2% 
Other 252 2.1% 
Total 11858 100.0% 
Table 1. Frequency of sources 
 
Source Type Percentages 
Press-related sources 46.1% 
Policymakers 
 
24.5% 
Press abuse victims related sources  9.2% 
Leveson and Royal Charter 7.8% 
Judiciary 
 
2.2% 
Police 2.1% 
Ordinary members of the public 1.6% 
Other 2.1 
Total  100.0% 
Table 2. Source types in related categories 
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Category        
of Writers 
The 
Guardian 
The 
Daily 
Mail 
The 
Daily 
Mirror 
The Daily 
Telegraph 
The 
Daily 
Express 
The  
Sun 
 
Total 
The newspaper’s 
staff/representative 
88.2% 98.3% 94.1% 91.5% 92.9% 88.5% 91.5% 
Campaigners for 
victims of the press 
0.9% 
  
1.0% 
 
1.0% 0.7% 
Victims of press 
abuse 
0.9% 
     
0.3% 
Campaigners for the 
press 
1.2% 1.2% 2.0% 0.5% 
 
4.2% 1.4% 
Representatives of 
associations 
0.9% 
     
0.3% 
Former media 
executives 
0.6% 
  
0.5% 7.1% 1.0% 0.7% 
A member of the 
public 
  
2.0% 1.0% 
  
0.3% 
Government    1.5%   0.3% 
Politicians 1.2%   2.5%  1.0% 1.1% 
Business/corporate 
organisations 
 
0.6% 
    
0.1% 
Academics 1.5%  2.0% 0.5%  1.0% 0.9% 
Other media 4.3%   1.0%  3.1% 2.2% 
 
Total 
 
100.0% 
 
100.0% 
 
100.0% 
 
100.0% 
 
100.0% 
 
100.0% 
 
100.0% 
Table 3. Category of Writers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Category of Writers in groups 
 
 
 
Writers   Percent 
Newspaper staff 91.5% 
Press related 4.3% 
Policymakers 1.4% 
Press abuse victims 1.0% 
Academics 0.9 
Representative of associations 0.3% 
Corporate organisations 0.1% 
Ordinary members of the public 0.3% 
Total 100.0% 
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